

MORALIZING VIOLENCE: Debating the Acceptability of Electrical Weapons

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17 April 2003 British Broadcasting Corporation, Radio 5 Live:

Presenter: 'Five twenty-seven. Police in England and Wales are to start carrying a controversial stun gun that will knock out suspects ...'

Interrupting voice-over: 'We will have a couple of clips and be with you, OK?'

Presenter: '... armed police. Early on Five Live the chief constable of Hertfordshire Paul Acres defended their use.'

Paul Acres: 'If they are used as they will be, in very tightly controlled circumstances, as an alternative to conventional firearms, it will provide us with another option which will enable our officers to resolve dangerous situations without resort to lethal force.'

Presenter: 'A view not shared by Mark Littlewood of Liberty.'

Mark Littlewood: 'These so-called non-lethal weapons, where they have actually been used in the United States of America have actually produced fatalities. I would like to see much more independent and thorough testing before we start testing this out on members of the public.'

Presenter: 'Well Doctor Brian Rappert is a researcher in Social Policy at the University of Nottingham. Brian, Good afternoon.'

Brian Rappert: 'Good afternoon.'

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Presenter: 'I gather you have been exposed to one of these guns, I wonder what that was like?'

How do and should academic researchers, concerned commentators and others characterize the acceptability or unacceptability of technology? What sort of knowledge is deemed important in making appraisals? What is at stake in the contrasting representations of technology offered? How should the topic of acceptability be approached? Consider the following statements suggesting contrasting assessments of the appropriateness of employing technologies based on the delivery of electricity to the human body, such as the Taser 'stun gun' mentioned above:

The thought of testing this [electrical] gun scared me. It was loud and overflowing with power. I was quite intimidated. I did however test the unit as I always do. The doctors say I will be fine. It was an experience. I must say that this gun moves right close to the top of the list as far as pain and intimidation.

[*Account of self-defence equipment distributor describing the test of a 400,000 volt electric device (J & L Self Defense Products, 2002).*]

This time they worked on me again and again with the electric baton on the nape of the neck and in the genitals and it hurt so much that even now when I speak it is difficult to keep my head still as the back of my neck hurts very much ... This type of weapon ... I could really call it something really horrible — immoral — because those people who make it for torture, they don't test it on their own bodies and they don't know the pain it causes. They do it to make other people suffer quite simply to make money. It's very sad.

[*Testimony of electroshock torture survivor from the former Zaire (Amnesty International, 1997, p. 1).*]

Case 2: suicidal girl

- Successful use against a child with deadly weapons
 - Westminster PD, CO [US] 5/01
 - 13-yr-old girl barricaded in bathroom
 - 2 butcher knives in hand
-

- Charges officers with knives raised overhead
- M26 [electric Taser] deployed with immediate effect
- ‘All officers on scene agree that she would be dead today without the M26’

[*Promotional slide from TASER International (2002) on the M26 electrical Taser*]

The quotes offer contrasting claims regarding what purposes, comparative options, experiences, and situational aspects are deemed relevant for assessing what are varyingly labelled as ‘electroshock weapons’, ‘electrical devices’, or (as here) ‘electrical weapons’.

This article examines, and is itself an exercise in, attempts to characterize the acceptability or unacceptability of controversial technology—what claims are made about such technology, what evidence and criteria for evidence are utilized, and how particular claims are mobilized into arguments. In doing so the paper considers attempts to separate and isolate possible ‘factors’ associated with the employment of technology in order to identify an ‘it’ that is the principal determiner of the acceptability of such action (as in Wolfe *et al.*, 2002). More specifically it asks how expertise, experience and classifications are marshalled by actors and analysts to offer credible claims about the acceptability of coercive violence (or what in more polite circles is called the use of force) with electrical weapons. It does so with particular emphasis regarding how academics can contribute to public debates (as in Fortun and Cherkasky, 1998; Lather, 1991). If ‘we’ are to engage in commentary about issues of the day and respond to questions posed (e.g. so what was it like, really?)—presumably in a manner informed by the theoretical and substantive knowledge that underpins our claims to expertise—then how should we proceed?

In examining the multiple ways in which complex and contentious actions are characterized to support determinations of their acceptability, this article considers the tensions, binds and dilemmas associated with particular determinations. The categorizations made and the basis claimed for credible knowledge can inadvertently facilitate the reproduction of hierarchies and distinctions they are purported to question. As argued here, characterizations of the acceptability of weaponry made by actors and analysts alike merit close scrutiny. Overall then, in asking what is at stake in discussions about the use of electrical weapons through examining claims about

their acceptability—paralleling Bonner's general suggestion for social theory (2001)—this article seeks to work out something of the problem of approaching the acceptability of technology.

In concerning itself with the underpinning and negotiation of claims to expertise, this article employs and examines the sorts of constructivist orientations to knowledge so dominant in technology studies today. 'Constructivism', however, refers to a diverse set of orientations to actors' and analysts' claims.

Pollner (1993) offers a typology of forms of constructionism in relation to their presumptions about social order: *objectivist* forms concerned with individuals' subjective claims about the social world that is objectively knowable by analysts; *topical* forms that suspend a knowledge of the true social order to consider how the practices and discourses of actors constitute an understanding of reality, this by the use of objective methods of analysis; and *analytical* forms that bring under the constructivist gaze definitions of the social order as well as the procedures by which analysts and others come to understand the world. Something of the implications and dilemmas associated with utilizing these different forms of constructivism for framing and grounding analyses of the acceptability of electrical weapons are considered below.

■ ELECTRICAL WEAPONS AND THE USE OF FORCE

In the last 30 years the range of portable weapons utilizing high intensity and short duration electrical pulses has expanded significantly; now including adopted shields, batons, hand held 'stun guns' and electrified water cannons. Whatever the effectiveness of such technology, their public acceptability has been a matter of debate.

While past government evaluations deemed electrical weapons *per se* as politically unacceptable for Western police forces (e.g. Egnar, 1976), more recently others have tried to counter this assessment by presenting them as 'magic bullets'. According to advocates, such weapons match the public's expectations for instantaneously effective tools that inflict little or no long-term physical harm (Heal, 1999; Mroz, 2003). Herein, they hold the radical potential for severing the common link made between force and physical injury. Still, despite such optimism, even among proponents there is an

“Forget the truncheon, police chief would prefer phaser guns”

Credit: Headline from an article by Jamie Wilson, *The Guardian*, Saturday February 14, 2004.

admission of a lingering, albeit misguided, public aversion to employing electricity.

An indication of the competing ways of making sense of electrical weapons can be read into the following:

Electricity speaks every language known to man. No translation is necessary. Everybody is afraid of electricity, and rightfully so. [Dennis Kaufman, President of Stun Tech Inc. (quoted from Amnesty International, 2001, p. 29).]

For the president of a company that produces belts that administer a remotely activated shock, the universal fear of electricity brings the promise of power to those able to harness it for self-protection or offensive ends. This characteristic is billed as a selling point in promotional literature. Quoted as part of an Amnesty International publication entitled *Stopping the Torture Trade*, the statement is marshalled to indicate the dangers associated with this type of force option, not least their potential to serve as instruments of intimidation.

The scope for making opposed assessments becomes further apparent when one moves away from abstracted remarks to consider particular incidence of use. Here questions about the acceptability of electricity blend with general questions about the acceptability of force. Few would argue agencies of the state, such as the police, are not justified in making some recourse to coercion in performing their duties. However, just when and what force is legitimate is debatable. Change any of the details in the ‘suicidal-13-year-girl-with-the-two-butcher-knives’ case above and a rather different appraisal might be concluded.

Instead of being mere descriptions, accounts of what happened would no doubt be better thought of as stories that are ‘rhetorically organized, construct the nature of the events, assemble description and narrative, and make attributional inferences available’ (Edwards, 1997, p. 16). Wherein furthermore, it seems reasonable to suggest

that the descriptions given by individuals would be oriented to presumptions of how others would evaluate them as being reasonable, adequate and persuasive.

Yet, even if a force incident were captured on video or the ‘essential’ facts of what happened could be agreed, this would not necessarily resolve contention. Despite part of the apprehension (or, if you prefer, bludgeoning) of Rodney King in Los Angeles in 1992 being captured on video, widespread agreement about the justification for the officers’ actions did not follow. Commentators have drawn on this incident as both a worst-case of police brutality as well as evidence that the public fundamentally misunderstands the need for force in the line of duty (Cannon, 1997; Myers, 1999; Koon, 1992). In these contrasting analyses, alternative starting and end points for that night’s events as well as seemingly minor interactional movements have been marshalled to substantiate diametrically opposed evaluations.

What united many of the commentators, however, was the belief that the video recording itself—no matter if it had recorded the night’s actions from beginning to end—could not provide a full understanding of what the incident was really about. The true meaning was not found in the ‘episode’ but rather in the ‘thematic’ (Iyengar, 1991) it represented—that being either (yet another) example of structured police abuse of black citizens, the daily recurring threats faced by officers in upholding public order, or (as in this analysis) an illustration of the potentially forever-contentious nature of force. Others have attempted to give a proper meaning to the event by isolating it as a unique aberration that had no corresponding thematic to which it could be related (see Lawrence, 2000).

The King incident is particularly relevant to a discussion of electrical weaponry because, though not often cited in many popular renditions, an electrical TASER was fired on him twice as part of the officers’ actions. Those sceptical of the potential for electrical weapons to reduce injury point to its role in complementing, rather than replacing, other forms of force (e.g. batons blows). Moreover, the King incident has led some to suggest that electrical devices, in particular, pose worries linked to the low visibility of being shocked. As Rejali (1999) contends ‘We all remember how badly Rodney King was beaten by the L.A. police but no one remembers how many times King was shocked and how much voltage he received’. TASER manufacturers and others have preferred to frame ‘the problem’ of the

King affair in terms of an effectiveness deficit (TASER International, 2002; Parloff, 1992). What is needed herein is a way of increasing the effectiveness of the devices to ensure officers do not have to resort to multiple forms of force and thus (inappropriately) be accused of 'excessive' force.

Overall, the acceptability of electrical weapons is a matter of considerable disagreement, where questions of purpose, necessity, idealism and morality are brought into play. Determinations are infused with interpretations and categorizations of events and devices. The remainder of this article considers some of the methods employed to negotiate disagreement, indeterminacy and interpretation in order to justify a certain reading of electrical weapons, how each of these also suggest how the problem of specifying the acceptability of technology should be approached, and the binds and dilemmas of the strategies offered.

■ LOCATING ACCEPTABILITY IN STORIES OF ORIGIN

As suggested above, one manner of trying to provide a particular meaning to contested events and technologies is to situate them in relation to other events and stories. By placing emphasis on certain actions, by beginning (and ending) the description of an episode at a certain time and place, particular characterizations of acceptability can be supported. Along these lines, the sociologist Darius Rejali (1998, 1999) has provided an analysis of the stories told about electrical weapons. He takes as his starting point the need to explain how the employment of electricity is simultaneously condemned in popular thinking in North America and Europe while being increasingly prevalent in police forces. Rejali finds the explanation for this in the alternative stories told of the origins and subsequent diffusion of electrical weapons.

One said story situates the origins of electrical weapons in practices of torture and the moral failings of individuals and society. Herein, popular thought portrays the practice of electrical shocking as invented by agents of repression such as the Nazi Gestapo and then subsequently diffused to others (e.g. the French in Algeria, Argentinean security forces, and the CIA in Indochina) only eventually to be incorporated into modern policing equipment. The essence of such devices is clear: they are essentially technologies of repression. Along these lines, Wright (1991) portrays interest in

electroshock weapons as part of a wider concern for developing new coercive technologies. The incorporation of such instruments into some police forces in democratic countries only serves to enhance their legitimacy elsewhere. While being weapons meant to inflict pain, one of their ‘key design criterion is that they should *appear* rather than actually *be* safe’ (Wright, 1991, p. 33).

According to Rejali, another story about these weapons locates their origins in the steady, progressive and rational application of electricity to address problems of social control. In tracing out patent applications, Rejali recounts many of the claims made for the application of electricity related to the arrest, interrogation and incarceration of criminals in the early twentieth century: the streetlight was supposed to engender fear in criminals, shining a beam during interrogation was meant to bring acts into the light of day, and the electrical chair was meant to provide a more humane form of capital punishment. From such early penal applications, electrical weapons such as stun guns developed as self-protection devices designed for members of the police and public. While in the ‘torture history’ the employment of electricity is meant to conceal effects and purposes, in the progressive story electricity helps make visible what was before hidden.

Although Rejali (1999) finds neither story accurate, he argues ‘this “dual origin” myth of electric torture … allows ordinary people to, on the one hand, condemn the diffusion of electric torture instruments and on the other hand tolerate its everyday use in their communities. And what is especially important, whenever a device is recast from one story into another, this has the effect of delegitimizing or re legitimizing its use’. Rejecting both stories of origin as inadequate, Rejali proposes a third; one that seeks to establish the real origins through expert analysis. This is a story where the contrasting origins mentioned above are not separate: ‘The history of electric torture involves both history and technology, self-interest and reason, accident and necessity, nature and society, and the two narratives that seem so nicely separate, are in fact deeply interlinked’ (Rejali, 1999).

With regard to what electrical devices really are, Rejali argues their complex history means a reading of origins cannot tell the correct story. Rather the proper reading is found in the context of their use. Their lack of long-term physical marks is said to make ‘electric torture equipment’ ideal tools where there is public scrutiny of security forces. This technology flourished, not in the most

“Amnesty demands medical trials for Taser stun guns”

Credit: Headline from an article by Richard Norton-Taylor, *The Guardian*, Wednesday December 3, 2003.

authoritarian countries (such as the Soviet Union), but in those with some level of democratic openness. As a result this ‘technology says more about democratization than authoritarianism’ (Rejali, 1999).

As presented by Rejali, understanding the purposes of electrical weapons is a matter of examining their functional alignment with the wider social and political context. In particular contexts, a property of electrical weapons (their lack of physical inscription) makes them highly desirable options. The problem of specifying the acceptability of technology is a problem of explaining just what it is for; a problem resolved through analysts mustering authoritative facts about where, when and why the technology has been used in order to illustrate the explanatory importance of context in revealing purposes. Rejali analysis adopts what Pollner called a form of objectivist constructionism, wherein the said confused views in the public are rendered understandable through definitive academic analysis that reveals the known and knowable world. Whether technology and context should be understood as suggested by Rejali and whether the latter is sufficient to provide a basis for the acceptability of electrical weapons are key issues herein.

■ CRIMINATIONS AND RECRIMINATIONS

By way of further elaborating the basis of contention about the acceptability of electrical weapons and examining Rejali’s analysis, this section considers the arguments and counterarguments regarding the merits of electroshock technology made by two prominent commentators: the manufacturer TASER International and the human rights group Amnesty International. These organizations are often identified as the key proponent and detractor for the technology and by some way the most internationally high profile commentators about electrical weapons.

Certainly at first glance, each organization offers differing accounts of the origins of electrical weapons aligned with ‘torture’ and

'progressive' histories presented in the last section. Amnesty International situates Tasers as part of the development of electroshock technology more generally (see Amnesty International, 1997, 2001). For decades such equipment has been reported in cases of torture and ill-treatment, both in nations such as the US where the public scrutiny of security forces is often assumed and in countries such as Turkey, China, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Iraq and Egypt where it is often not. Whereas in the past the technology was rudimentary (e.g. cattle prods, modified electric telegram machines), today weapons specifically designed to deliver painful shocks are mass produced. In addition, while identifying marks and substantiating their cause have often proven difficult, the residual marks from electrical shock weapons are being catalogued to corroborate claims of abuse (Rasmussen, 2002).

In contrast, TASER International, formerly AIR TASER, depicts the technology's development as a specific, progressive and entrepreneurial endeavour born out of the necessity of responding to clear and present dangers:

In 1991, two friends of Rick and Tom Smith were brutally murdered by an angry motorist. Concerned about the increasing violence in their neighborhood, the Smith brothers purchased a gun for their mother. She refused to use a deadly weapon for self-protection. As a result, the two brothers found a solution. In 1993, they formed AIR TASER®, Inc., and began production with inventor Jack Cover, on a non-lethal self-defense device that has revolutionized personal protection and law enforcement today (TASER International, 2003).

One can get an idea of the purported and evidently self-evident revolution now underway through marketing and training materials presenting videos of the deployment of the TASER (see TASER International, 2002):

The Scene: A man identified as in possession of a handgun stares blankly ahead in the middle of the road, oblivious of his surroundings. Despite police negotiations he refuses to move or give up his weapon.

The Response: Officers approach the man from behind and employ the Taser. He collapses. The man is arrested and the gun confiscated.

In brief, the potential is that of resolving confrontations with few injuries to recipients or officers. The promise given to electrical weapons arguably draws on and substantiates more general stories today about the need to find ‘humanitarian’ force options for the military and the police. If a problem is admitted with the technology in marketing literature, that is a lack of effectiveness across all operational situations and targets; a problem recently solved by the launch of the M26 ADVANCED TASER that administers 26 watts (instead of the previous seven) for ‘as close to 100% TAKEDOWN POWER as you can get’ (TASER International, 2000, p. 1).

Once we move beyond such broad positions though, the debate about the acceptability of electrical weapons gets more complicated than that of opposing assessments informed by alternative stories of origins and resulting probable purposes. Unwavering claims about acceptability of electric weapons and determinants of their acceptability do not stem from a depiction of origins or contexts of use.

Amnesty International and the ‘torture trade’

Despite often providing a counter in the media to optimistic claims about the benefits of electrical weapons (e.g. Walker, 2003), the position of groups such as Amnesty International is not simply one of opposition. International agreements under the United Nations and elsewhere encourage the development of ‘non-lethal’ weapons to reduce casualties from firearms and batons. Acknowledging such potential, there are difficult choices about whether electrical weapons, as such, ought to be a concern. The choice must be made of raising issues with any uptake of the Tasers or other electrical weapons in an effort to stigmatize them *per se* versus reacting to improper employments and corresponding issues of user training, motivations, accountability, etc. on a case-by-case basis. These options suggest different bases for substantiating appraisals.

In the spirit of treating electrical weapons (as well as other police weaponry) as potentially useful options whose risks and benefits should be assessed, Amnesty International calls for governments to:

- Conduct an independent and rigorous review of the use of equipment where its use in practice has revealed a substantial risk of abuse or unwarranted injury. Suspend the transfer of such equipment to other countries pending the results of the review.
- Introduce strict guidelines on the use of police and security equipment [and set] up adequate monitoring mechanisms to keep the guidelines under review and to ensure they are adhered to (Amnesty International, 2001, p. 51).

As expressed by such recommendations, Amnesty seeks a legal-rationalistic basis for authority, one that strives for a definitive assessment of the effects and use of technology. Such calls in turn make Amnesty International a credible organization in the world of public policy deliberations.

However, the position is not without its difficulties. While the suspension of transfers might not be highly questioned when users are identified from countries associated with persistent human rights violations, some of the most frequent concerns about electroshock technology relate to the US where their deployment is somewhat widespread. While calling for an end to the use of electrical weapons in the former countries is relatively unproblematic (at least in relation to many of Amnesty's largely Western membership and government audiences), in the case of the latter sweeping appraisals that would justify country-wide cessation of transfers are less easily secured.

Likewise labelling ill-treatment and excessive force in the US as 'torture' is recognized as problematic (Mecklin, 1996). In addition, there is the fear that characteristics of weapons—their portability, their ease of use, and the inability of users to gauge the force they are inflicting—might mean they 'inherently lend [themselves] to human rights abuse' (Amnesty International, 1999; see also Amnesty International, 1997, 2001).¹

As the opportunity has arisen, Amnesty International has also supported the categorical condemnation of electrical weapons in certain locales. After challenging legally and ethically dubious shipments of electroshock weapons from the UK to security forces in countries such as Indonesia in the early 1990s, the organization supported the 1997 British government policy to classify electrical

weapons (explicitly including the Taser) as *instruments of torture* for the purposes of export controls. As such their transfer from the UK is strictly forbidden. In this case, categorical condemnation of the technology was based on past experience where British traders sold such ‘goods’ and what they were used for.

Opportunity turned to dilemma in 2002–03 when the Home Office introduced Tasers into the British police. This not only questioned the overall consistency of UK government policy, but its support by Amnesty International. A difficulty was whether to reinforce existing UK categorical condemnations by insisting they should apply to British policing (“instruments of torture are instruments of torture”) or to support a risk–benefit type assessment of their likely use in the UK (“they will or will not be used responsibly”). Adopting the latter position while supporting export torture categorizations would hazard allegations of applying (Western) presumptions about where abuses take place (i.e. somewhere else), a stance to be avoided by an organization that seeks impartiality, universality, and the unconditional condemnation of human rights violations.

TASER International and life saving technology

An appreciation of the counter to raising concerns about Tasers *per se* and particularly attempts to link them with ill-treatment or torture can be gleaned from the following statement made by the former New York Police Department Commissioner (and now board member of TASER International), Bernard Kerick (2002), given at a company marketing event for police agencies:

We don’t get hurt; they don’t get hurt ... That’s what this is about. [The Taser] is a great benefit to society. I was talking to one of the chiefs earlier, I think it was the sheriff, who said he received a letter from Amnesty International ... Amnesty International is annoyed because we use the Taser [audience chuckles]. What Amnesty International does not realize, our using the Taser is to their benefit because ... they like to defend the lowest form of human interest. Well, OK let them defend them. We are helping them. They don’t get shot and killed. They get taken down and then they go to jail or they get taken down to a hospital. It is a real benefit to Amnesty International, except I am waiting for that letter to come and

say thank you, except I am not sure it is coming [audience laughter]. So with that I think we should talk to the people that really know Taser for what it is worth. They have had the insight, the experience, and the knowledge to use Taser, to benefit from it. And we will start with Sheriff ...

This statement offers a much different way of making sense of the issues at stake and who is able to speak about them. Those who oppose novel weaponry or cast doubt on its legitimacy are, in effect, presented as supporting more, not less, suffering. The Kerick quote also highlights an alternative basis for the credibility of claims. In contrast to out-of-touch or somewhat perversely motivated organizations, law enforcement officers (and those in a position to speak for them) are said to have a double legitimacy in determining the merits of technology given their professional expertise and positional advantage/practical experience in relation to conflict situations (see Hall, 1977). It is they who, working in-hand with progressive technology, ensure the use of force accords with expectations for minimal harm.

Outside of promotional speeches, companies such as TASER International have not simply dismissed concerns about the misuse of these weapons. The US government and others have suggested the potential for torture or abuse with the Taser throughout its history (see Laur, 1999). The latest Taser model contains an electronic data chip that records the time and date of every firing. The information recorded can protect officers against unfounded allegations as well as help substantiate allegations about the excessive use of force. As the Director of Government Affairs at TASER International argued in seeking to differentiate his product from others:

How many baton strikes, kicks and punches have been thrown at suspects by police officers over the years? That may not be quantifiable. It's up to the officer, suspect and witness to sort out. The M26 is the only less-lethal (and lethal) weapon that records its usage ... No other weapon provides this level of solid and direct accountability (Tuttle, 2003, p. 2).

Conceived of in this way, abuse is a problem of individual wrong doing that can be detected through tallying data; this rather than abuse stemming from systematic cultures of violence and secrecy. That force needs to be more accountable at all though, suggests

scope for concern about users' motives and practices in a way not acknowledged in some promotional banter.

Proponents of electrical weapons such as Tasers also face various difficulties in establishing just what the technology is for, particularly in relation to its rationale and benefits vis-à-vis conventional 'lethal' options. In some situations (as in the Kerick quote), Tasers are seen as a response to the widespread use of firearms:

It is unfortunate that our society [the US] needs any weapons. But the fact remains that violence, like cancer, will continue to occur. And while chemotherapy is a highly unpleasant process, it is superior to the alternative of certain death. Our society has a cancer called gun violence, and non-lethal weapons can serve as the chemotherapy ... With a [Taser] or other non-lethal weapons, no one dies. No one is crippled. No one is maimed. Medical costs are zero. There is no pain, no suffering (Smith, 1997, p. 32).

As a lifesaver, the Taser is a far more acceptable response to gun violence than lethal force. Yet, in other contexts, it has been remarked that the Taser is also 'not a substitute for lethal force' (TASER International, 2002) or, more colloquially, one 'should not take a Taser to a gun fight' (Smith, 2002). While in the UK Tasers are only (initially; see Rappert, 2003c) being trialed with the small percentage of officers armed with firearms, this sort of policy is presented as far too restrictive for TASER International which actively promotes 'full deployment' (i.e. Tasers for all street officers). Furthermore, instead of waiting until lethal force is required, the company suggests that 'early, aggressive use of a less-lethal weapon like the M26 can prevent many ... situations from escalating to deadly force levels' (TASER International, 2002).

The ambiguous relationship of the Taser to firearms reportedly manifests itself in their design. Earlier versions took the shape of a rectangular box with a grip protruding from the back end—what the Seattle Police Department Deputy Chief of Operations referred to as something resembling a 'portable vacuum cleaner' (Kimerer, 2003). More recent versions take the shape of a handgun. In turn, however, to avoid the public and officers confusing the Taser for a real gun, it is available in colours such as florescent yellow and the manufacturer advises it be holstered in an alternative manner than a firearm.

This section considered competing appraisals of Tasers and multiple approaches for establishing their acceptability in public debates. In doing so, it has moved from marshalling definitive claims about what these technologies are and what they can do in the last section to a topical form of constructivism concerned with how notions of acceptability are constituted through certain discourses and practices. The origins or context of use of the technology noted by Rejali, while not irrelevant, are hardly treated as sufficient for the prominent organizations discussed here to resolve questions about acceptability.

Rather than simply treating matters of acceptability in terms of the marshalling of facts to support particular explanations of what electrical weapons really are, this section has suggested the multiple, shifting and sometimes conflicting discursive claims offered. As such, attempts to offer particular, stable and invariant representation of what each believes about the ‘real’ acceptability of Tasers by an overall objectivist analysis is problematic. Arguments and counterarguments about the acceptability of the employment of Tasers often turn on questions regarding to what extent physical artefacts should be the real focus of action or whether the main determinants of acceptability rest elsewhere, such as in the motivations of users. These matters are not mutually exclusive. As suggested, notions about the identity of users often infuse with categorizations of the technology and visa-versa.

■ REPRESENTING AND REVEALING PAIN

The last two sections analysed efforts to establish credible determinations of the acceptability of electrical weapons through drawing on notions of their origins, their context of use, and various ‘user-related’ considerations. Of course, manufacturers, human rights groups and academics do not just engage in these general deliberations about force options, but also represent experiences of being shocked, this by way of offering compelling claims for their market, membership or readership constituencies. When attention shifts to such representations, then a topic barely mentioned but never far from the surface in the last two sections takes on a heightened relevance: the experience of pain.

As suggested by the three quotations at the start of this article, pain in particular and personal experience more generally are contested argumentation resources. As Scarry (1985) argued, the inadequacy of words for conveying experience is acute in attempts to describe pain. In addition, individuals experience pain in different ways; an event traumatic for one person may not be significant for another—what in the jargon of government appraisals is referred to as ‘biological variation’ (Hepper, 2003).

The inexpressibility and variability of pain means portrayals of it are latent with questions about the credibility and authenticity of narratives and narrators. Thus attempts to provide ‘accurate’ representations of experience to ground acceptability are fraught with ambivalence and insecurity. Just where accounts locate the determiner of pain—whether that is seen as residing in the invariant capabilities of weapons, in the variable biological make-up of bodies, or in individual’s psychology—is a matter that can buttress alternative appraisals. Whether personal accounts of pain are even pertinent for establishing acceptability is something not agreed upon.

For human rights groups that have as one of their primary goals the reporting of acts of unwarranted state violence, the strategies for representing pain are not those that might be presumed. Wilson (1997) has commented on the contingencies and limitations of reports of human rights abuses made by organizations such as Amnesty International who strive to achieve a credible standing among states and international bodies. While the proper manner of representation is contested, he argues the legal-rationalistic basis for authority typically sought by many human rights organizations mean they aspire to a ‘culture of scientism’ as represented by the search for universal classifications and objective data. That generally entails adopting a legalistic language to describe individuals wronged and human rights violated that gives little credence for subjective experiences as a guide for assessing acts (see Rappert, 2003a, Chapter 9). In this, a consideration of how information is gathered and assembled typically goes missing from public view in the search for universalistic arguments about rights and violations based on certain knowledge.

Through such representational strategies, acts of force take on a status of being events objectively describable. Specific depictions of abuse generally consist of a litany of actions that could have no

possible justification—they are wrong and should be stopped. While such an approach might mesh with the objectivist and legalist language of states that Amnesty International seeks to influence, it is not without its tensions.

Certainly, as indicated above, this means subjective experiences of pain do not have a place in policy positions (see Amnesty International, 2003); this despite certain policing weapons being designed to cause as much pain as feasible while supposedly not inflicting severe lasting injuries (i.e. they function through pain compliance). When subjective accounts of pain, humiliation, fear, and uncertainty are presented—as in the case of the Zaire torture survivor given at the start of the article—subjectivity is restricted to victims rather than being a condition afflicting human rights organizations. If victims' experiences have a curtailed place, then those of accused perpetrators have none.

Yet, while it is one thing for Amnesty International to speak to its largely Western membership and audiences about torture in Iraq or Zaire in a manner that presumes the solidity of facts and the complete abhorrence of the motivations of perpetrators, such representational strategies become problematic when adopted for allegations of excessive force by police officers in Western countries where concerns about their justifications for action are given some salience in public discussions.

While human rights groups seeking a legitimate voice in the court of states might often adopt a highly rationalistic, minimalist, literalist language where the space for subjective experiences is curtailed, companies such as TASER International are also at work representing the experience of being shocked, mainly to would-be users. If electrical weapons are to be deemed legitimate force options within the police and not associated with torture, unreasonable or excessive force, then the relative acceptability of being shocked must be secured.

While some early marketing presentations of the Taser denied considerations of pain (the ‘no pain, no suffering’ quote above), rather than rejecting experience or expressing it in a minimalist language, recent company marketing material for police officers and others prominently depicts individuals being shocked. Clips of ‘tasered’ police volunteers serve to demonstrate both the weapon’s effectiveness and benignity (as in Table 1).

Table 1. ‘Feeling is believing’^a—TASER International (2002) Promotional Video

Visual	Audio
Script cue: [Full screen, black background & white lettering throughout] ‘Over 3,000 Volunteers’, fade out.	
Stock cue: Foreground—sole man facing camera. Background: group of men, one pointing Taser at man in foreground. Taser fired.	Single receipt: ‘Ah, ah, ah, ah, ah, ahhhhh...’
Stock cue: Foreground—receipt slowing sinks to floor mats with being supported by two men.	Single receipt: ‘Oh boy, that felt good’. Group laughter.
Script cue: ‘Have Tested the ADVANCED TASER’, fade out.	
Stock cue: cliptage, testing of Taser on volunteers.	
Script cue: ‘Some Alone’, fade out.	
Stock cue: mixed cliptage, various tests on volunteers.	Receipt screams and shouts mixed with laughter of onlookers.
Script cue: ‘Some in Groups ...’, fade out.	
Stock cue: various cliptage, numerous tests on volunteers line together on their knees with interlocking hands.	Varied receipt screams and shouts followed by laughter of onlookers.
Script cue: ‘Some Rode the Full 5 Seconds ...’, fade out.	
Stock cue: cliptage, two activations of Tasers.	Varied receipt screams and shouts followed by laughter of onlookers.
Script cue visual: ‘Some Rode 2 ADVANCED TASERS’, fade in ‘(For the full 5 seconds)’.	
Stock cue: cliptage, two activations of Tasers.	Varied receipts screams and shouts followed by laughter of onlookers.
Script cue: ‘But they all share one thing in common ...’	
Stock cue: cliptage, man getting up after being shocked	One receipt: ‘I’m done, I’m done, I’m done! ... Waaaaaa’ followed by cheers from onlookers.
Script cue: ‘They’re all OK’.	
Script cue: ‘WARNING: These demonstrations were performed under strict safety guidelines. Consult a certified TASER instructor for safety instructions before attempting any such tests’.	

^aR. Smith comments about exposures given at ‘Advanced Taser Instructor Certification Course’, 29–30 October, Brussels.

Whereas the space and function of individuals' subjective experiences within Amnesty International accounts might be curtailed, through depictions of situated experiences and social interactions, manufacturers of weapons such as Tasers seek to turn subjective experiences into intersubjective agreement about just what *the technology* does—the certain, known and relatively acceptable (even comical) consequences of being shocked. The acceptability of the consequences proves the acceptability of weapons. To coin a phrase, 'that is what this is about'.

Such exposures are supposed to provide a basis for credible knowledge. As company instructor material states, 'our reasoning for recommending such a sample is that the Instructor is truly enabled to know and understand how the M26 works. This will help better articulate the ADVANCED TASER's effects both as an instructor and potentially as an expert in court if necessary' (Smith, n.d., p. 1). Pfaffenberger arguably spoke to the importance of such taster exposures when he said that through technological rituals "intentions", no less than the facticity and hardness of technology's "impact" are themselves constituted and constructed in reciprocal and discursive interaction with technologies' (Pfaffenberger, 1992, p. 282).

■ A 'SHOCKING EXPERIENCE'

The previous sections suggested the importance of securing the credibility of narrators and narrations in speaking about the acceptability of electrical weapons. As argued, the bases for credibility advanced are often exclusionary by establishing narrow definitions of what counts as credible knowledge and (explicitly or implicitly) who can possess it.

To only work with the prominent public claims cited above is not a choice without implication. To limit discussions of acceptability to such material would entail working within the parameters established by the existing particular and partial public discussions, thereby tacitly accepting and perpetuating the nature of 'the problem' as set out therein. In light of the argument above about the contested status of appraisals of force, such an approach has consequences for the status of analysis.

In an effort to make a space for analysis that might comment on what it means to enter the domain of those 'truly' enabled to understand how the Taser works, I attended an exposure 'taster'

session held by Taser International. During 29–30 October 2002, it sponsored a promotional conference in Brussels for police forces and distributors in Europe and elsewhere. Participants received one day of training in the use of the 26-watt ADVANCED TASER intended to certify them as ‘master instructors’ and a day presentation from European officers on their preliminary deployments with the new model. As in the marketing video, nearly all conference attendees received a ‘flavor’ 0.25–0.5 second burst of electricity as proof of the non-lethality of Tasers. As in the video, everyone recovered from the shock within a few moments and received an encouraging congratulatory response from onlookers. Supportive experts all?

Of course, what counts as credible expertise is rarely straightforward. While group rituals such as this are often indispensable in constituting an understanding of the effects and purposes of technology, in practice their significance for providing a guide to real life experience is contestable and contested. Contestable because the taster experiences were for a fraction of the normal exposure (the five second default time), in a co-operative and artificial setting where individuals volunteered and braced themselves for exposure, etc. Such exposures are contested because their importance has been actively disputed. As indicated at the conference, under pressure from police departments, TASER International has changed its policy from one *requiring* to *recommending* sample hits for *trainers* (Smith, n.d.). Despite officers from Britain being trained and shocked at the conference, the police union in England and Wales has taken a categorical stand against the need for the exposures of police officers (and trainers) on the basis that it is not necessary for officers to feel pain to understand a weapon’s effectiveness or severity (Dalley, 2003).

Experiences are contested as well because even when individuals do experience pain, some just don’t seem to get it. For instance, at the conference howls of derision from the audience met one television news clip of a British reporter who was said to be emotionally traumatized after receiving a taster shock. Taking ‘the shock’ together provided a basis for downplaying the experiences of others who did not recover with ease.

As suggested in the argument above, just how the experience of being shocked ought to be represented and what basis for expertise it should be treated as providing are less than clear. Once analysts go

beyond the pretence of merely examining others' credibility-making procedures, to instead offer accounts of our own, the viability of limiting analysis to a topical form of constructivism is difficult to maintain. In an effort to tell my interpretation of the conference to a large audience, I wrote up my impressions of it for a prominent media outlet, the journal *New Scientist* (Rappert, 2003b).

Entering into such a media forum can mean negotiating sometimes contrasting expectations about what counts as interesting, rigorous, expert and persuasive knowledge. Although notionally a single authored piece, through various editorial 'stylistic' revisions the final write-up drew little directly on the first submitted draft. In thinking any credible account should speak to general issues beyond particular experiences, the first version considered a wide range of concerns about how Tasers ought to be appraised: the importance of social science analysis to understand the propensity to the recourse to force, the 'local' issues associated with introducing this technology into the British police, the perennial tensions with establishing the appropriateness of force, the disputable artificiality of taster exposures, and the past failure of other such 'non-lethal' weapons to live up to marketing claims. The contention that Tasers should be compared to conventional firearms was called into doubt through reporting the manufacturer's suggestion that they were 'good for demonstrators' and those passively resisting (this including 'tree huggers' and those shouting 'hell no, we won't go').

Yet through a series of mutually agreed re-writes initially forwarded by *New Scientist* staff based on presumptions of what its readers would find relevant and newsworthy (and thus what would be published), many of the issues initially detailed were removed in favour of a more exposé style where what I heard and felt took centre stage.

That personal experience was deemed important in the revision process meant it was negotiated as well. For instance, the initial draft sought to acknowledge how experience is contested and problematic. While hardly irrelevant, for the reasons outlined above, accounts of being shocked cannot provide a simple guide to what should be done. As I saw it, to represent my exposure as indicating the actual nature of 'the pain caused by the Taser' would locate the main determinant of their acceptability in the invariant properties of the technology rather than acknowledging the inter-relations between settings, technology and experiences. Yet, providing a strictly

personal account about this particular event would perhaps unduly individualize the experience. In other words, there were difficulties in representing the shock as something that existed ‘out there’ or just something ‘in here’ (me).

By way of acknowledging indeterminacies, open-endedness, and binds of just what such an exposure should be said to represent, the multiple grounds for evaluating them, and the difficulty of expressing pain, in the middle of the original draft I characterized the taster exposure in the following terms:

For my shock I laid on the floor and held hands in a line with several other people. Contrasting accounts can be given of what happened. On the one hand, like many people I kicked my legs up in the air, shouted out something, and then got up when it was over apparently none-the-worse. As retold, it was not that bad. On the other hand, it would be possible to describe the incident in terms of feeling an intense wave of excruciating pain run up and down my body. In other words, I never want to go through it again. Trying to convey that sense of pain beyond just saying it was ‘painful’ or ‘very painful’ though is quite difficult.

Acknowledging the constructed status of the procedures by which analysts and others portray the world does not lead to paralysis, but it does problematize many forms of representation and argumentation. In an effort to acknowledge the multiple readings of experience but move beyond this to critically comment on the import of such exercises, while also simultaneously drawing on and questioning the experience of being shocked as some sort of guarantor of credible knowledge, following on from the quote above, in the draft version I *forwarded* a bind on the basis of my experience regarding the import of that experience. While a fraction of a second exposure is taken in such rituals as an indication of the acceptability of administering a five second shock, I suggested:

Writing from the perspective of someone shocked, though, I have my doubts about the import of such brief familiarization exercises. An exposure to 1/20th the normal field time in controlled and supportive settings seems a world away from what might be experienced in real world usages.

Post-stylistic revisions, the bind remained but the eventual publication led with:

How can you describe being shocked by an electrical weapon that delivers 50,000 volts? To the onlookers, mostly police officers and weapons distributors, my experience was apparently rather unimpressive—or at least that's what their faces showed. All of us had been subjected to a brief burst of electricity from an 'Advanced Taser' designed to temporarily incapacitate the human body. In my case I kicked my legs up in the air (I was lying down at the time), shouted something, and then got up as soon as it was over, apparently none the worse.

The feeling within was less banal, however. The shock sent a severe wave of excruciating pain running through my body. It is certainly not something I want to go through again (Rappert, 2003b, p. 34).

While not an inaccurate description, the question can be asked what this particular account suggests as a representation.² Considering whether such an account is satisfactory invokes questions about purpose of analysis.

■ ACCEPTABLE GROUNDING?

By way of examining the dynamics associated with controversial technologies, this article has sought to address how the acceptability or unacceptability of electrical weapons is characterized; what knowledge is deemed important in making appraisals and what issues are at stake in the contrasting representations of technology offered. In doing so it has sought to highlight the dilemmas of appraisals of electrical weapons as well as the criteria of evidence marshalled therein. Contrasting descriptions of events and varying spaces afforded to history and personal experience have been forwarded as justifying determinations of what electrical weapons are (instruments of torture vs. mere instruments), what they do (e.g. stun, shock or

cause intense, unspeakable pain) and what they are for (e.g. tools for concealing the employment of force vs. magic bullets).

It has been argued that characterizations of such matters are given for particular audiences with a view to providing persuasive accounts; wherein determinations of identity, technology and context mutually inform one another. Thus to suggest that debates about the acceptability of controversial technologies should be approached through treating technology, context and constituencies' values as separable factors (e.g. Wolfe *et al.*, 2002) is to miss the way in which such elements are mutually constituted. To take particular divisions as unproblematic is to ignore the varied contingencies entailed and the interpretative work necessary to portray them in this manner.

Through examining the shifting basis for making determinations of acceptability, this article has also sought to work out something of the problem of analysing the acceptability of technology. That has been characterized as a problem of establishing an 'it' (or its) that can persuasively be said to be the principal, sovereign or determining source of acceptability, thus resolving the disagreements and indeterminacies associated with force. Proposals for 'it' included: the origins or context of use (section three); the technical qualities of weapons or motivations of users (section four); or the experiences of those shocked (section five). Such arbitrators in turn offer particular prescriptions about what needs to be done (e.g. further technical innovation, the reform of social organizations, etc.) and the 'it' identified suggests who is competent to speak about the issues at hand.

As told, a great amount of work often goes into fixing distinctions and in trying to impress the importance of particular determinants. Such boundary deceptions present 'the problem' of determining acceptability in terms of credibly revealing something that solidly 'exists' somewhere in the first place (Woolgar, 2002; Grint and Woolgar, 1997, Chapter 3). Attempts to forward a certain basis of acceptability over another fractures the world along oppositional and accusatorial lines: how events appear versus how they actually are; what technology does versus what it appears to do; why people act versus why they say they act; what accounts of experience are authentic which are not. A danger of such dichotomies is that they help substantiate assumed divides between the social and the technical (as well as what counts as the 'real' or 'primary' qualities of the

latter—e.g. their invisible effects, accountability, morality, etc.) that should be understood as contingent achievements made from a specific normative position.

In considering the various appraisals made of electrical weapons and the ‘it’ identified, this article has also sought to examine how the topic of acceptability is approached by actors and analysts. It has done so, in part, by employing and examining distinctions between different forms of constructivism for orientating to and bracketing judgments about what counts as convincing evidence and plausible argumentation. Herein analyses consistent with Pollner’s typology of objectivist (Rejali’s critique of ‘public’ views), topical (the assessment of Amnesty International and TASER International’s policy positions) and analytical (the shocking account given in the last section) constructivism were presented. Each type of analysis could be said to be geared towards different purposes; questioning facts, presumptions and argumentative strategies, and forms of representation.

Something of the problems associated with particular constructivisms have been elaborated. For instance, section four argued that TASER International and Amnesty International offer multiple and arguably tension-ridden appraisals of weapons and users to forward credible determinations of acceptability for particular audiences. Herein, seeking unity and coherence through objectivist constructivist analysis is a theoretical approach of questionable worth. In addition, to take for granted or ignore how certain bases for argument are seen as credible in the first place is to miss out much of what is going on in differing appraisals. Yet, limiting analysis to topical forms of constructivism concerned with others’ claims is not only limited in its practical import, but arguably fails to engage with key questions about analysts’ presumptions of what they represent and how.

Through the re-telling of my experience of being shocked at the training conference, it was suggested that the need to present reasonable and plausible accounts for certain audiences is not just a concern for prominent organizations, but also relevant for academic analysts.³ Thus the importance of bringing analysts’ arguments under a constructionist gaze—to engage in analytical constructivism—in examining debates about acceptability becomes difficult to ignore once analysts explicitly offer their own deceptions of acceptability.

Yet, just what the recognition of this should imply—just how and to what extent analytical constructivism should be ‘followed’—is less than straightforward. That the account of the negotiation of accounts provided in the last section should be taken as reflecting what really happened itself relies on suspending scepticism.⁴

While something of the difficulties of both resisting and following through an analytical constructivist orientation were suggested above, further points could be raised. Throughout this article, the attempt to provide a convincing discussion of debates about the acceptability of electrical weapons (the acceptability of the framing of acceptability) has relied on assertions about the world as well as conventions about what counts as reasonable and plausible argumentation. With regard to the latter, while section four suggested the limitations of simplified and stereotyped views of the positions of human right groups and manufacturers that might be presumed, the argument itself has relied on attributing motivations in the search for credible claims to explain the variability of positions taken and establish the reasons for and the salience of tensions in assessments of electrical weapons.

That this approach is itself reasonable as a basis for analysts’ analysis should not be assumed given the previous arguments regarding the need to closely consider the determinations of what counts as adequate evidence. As Bonner argues (2001—following Blum and McHugh, 1984) to draw on motivations as done here is to take for granted the reasonability of these concepts as ways of making sense of the world. The use of motive or other related notions as a device for accounting for actors’ position (such as needing to meet bottom line editorial constraints in the retelling of experiences) can be interpreted as a way of bringing analysis to an end (rather than engaging in it) by taking for granted the adequacy of such argumentation.

Such reflexive considerations about how to ground analysis and the validity of implicit forms of topical constructivism are perennial problems faced by those adopting constructivist orientations to knowledge. Those that wish can draw attention to the presumptions made in analysis to suggest that it is duplicitous; thereby enacting further oppositional and accusatorial lines. Continuously questioning the bases of claims, however, risks failing to provide any

sort of account of social life. In relation to such problematics, Bonner suggests that taking proper responsibility for analysis requires giving it a sense of purpose. Herein, it is necessary for analysts to ‘deal with the problems of community and authority as against just theory and empiricism, reconstruct intellectual life as against just seek sounder sociological investigations, and seek an authentic relation with others as against [merely pursuing] methodological objectives’ (Bonner, 2001, p. 270).

In a somewhat similar fashion, those concerned about the potential practical import of analysis to speak to issues of the day have suggested the importance of the purpose of research. In speaking about the double-binds of counter-expertise and academic collaboration with social movements, Fortun and Cherkasky (1998, p. 164) suggest ‘The challenge is to recognize that any mode of representation inevitably involves mismatch, then choose the mode of representation most able to engage the task at hand’. Holestein and Miller (1993) likewise advise that what sort of analysis is given should depend on the purposes sought. So too in multiple ways has the previous analysis suggested the importance of purpose in determining the acceptability of analysts’ accounts. As argued, those that do not seek merely an intellectual engagement with issues but in some sense a practical and purposeful one can steer around many of the epistemological problems of analysis and find an acceptable grounding for deciding just what claims should be offered.

Determinations of purpose given as part of a telling of theory-practice, however, are not immune from questioning about their reasonability and how they are relied on to close down debate. For instance, this article could have approached the acceptability of electrical weapons as a matter of how to marshal counter-expertise to state and corporate proclamations. For the past several years I have been a member of the Amnesty International (UK) Military, Security and Police Working Group. Although much of the work of that group has centred on the proliferation of military weapons from the UK, with the growing international emphasis on ‘non-lethal’ policing weaponry, the analysis of such options has become an increasing part of the group’s remit. The relation of the group’s activities and my research could be characterized by multiple alignments and disalignments.



Quality Assured: Electrical ‘Stun Gun’ with European CE Control Mark.
Credit: Robin Ballantyne.

Certainly it is possible, even tempting, to use purpose as an ‘it’ for suggesting what argument should have been given and what the real meaning is of the argument given. For instance, in the editorial process for this article it was suggested that I ‘explain (near the beginning) how you originally entered this issue—e.g. by advising AI on their arguments about acceptability (i.e. [criteria for deciding acceptability of electrical weapons])—and felt the need to go beyond that level. You should speak autobiographically at the beginning, e.g. by shifting forward some passages which now appear near the end’.

Any such telling of purpose would be (and is) highly performative and partial in evoking a sense of the real motivations for my research and thereby what issues were presented and why. Yet, purpose does not provide a solid grounding for analysis. With the multiple and competing claims made by Amnesty International about electrical weapons as surveyed above, to use my links with it as a basis to suggest the motivations for my research (i.e. the purpose of my asking about purpose) should prompt as many questions as it could

purport to provide answers to. Any characterizations of purpose should invite questions about the purpose of drawing on arguments about purpose and how some renditions of purpose are deemed credible, reasonable or duplicitous.

In striving to work through these points about purpose in and of the analysis of technology, there are no simple and final resolutions. This article has stressed the importance of a combination of analysis and practice that invokes and enables debating the nature of technology, context and purpose as well as how they are approached in the course of analyses. As part of how we, as analysts, engage in public debates of the day, drawing on purpose as a bottom line for what analysis ought to be given is problematic, or at least partial and performative. Rather than taking purpose as a resource for making arguments, it may be more productive to seek a creative tension in asking how the purpose is explicitly invoked or implicitly implied and its performance in arguments. Such a strategy for engaging in constructivist examinations need not entail a retreat from engaging in purposeful and practical analysis, since it is part and parcel of it.

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□ NOTES

1. And at a practical level, of course, trying to document and prove violations to rules with novel and potentially dangerous technology—in effect to police the police—is a mission that would tax the abilities of any organization.
2. Subsequently, this deception of experience provided a credible basis for me to be approached as an expert commentator on subsequent British policy developments (BBC, 2003; Walker, 2003).
3. Moreover, as told, the telling of my taster exposure relied on constructivist presumptions to give it meaning.
4. The distinction has been taken up elsewhere as justification for mobilizing against electrical weapons (Martin and Wright, 2003).

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